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The FDIC Should Not Allow Commercial  
Firms to Acquire Industrial Banks
By Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr.
Introduction
On March 17, 2020, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) issued a notice of proposed 
rulemaking, entitled “Parent Companies of Industrial 
Banks and Industrial Loan Companies.”1 The FDIC’s 
proposed rule (the “Proposed ILC Rule”) would 
apply to FDIC-insured industrial banks and industrial 
loan companies (hereinafter collectively referred to as 
“ILCs”) that are controlled by “Covered Companies.” 
Parent companies of ILCs would be treated as “Covered 
Companies” if they are not subject to consolidated 
supervision by the Federal Reserve Board (Fed). The 
Proposed ILC Rule would establish terms and con-
ditions governing applications for deposit insurance, 
changes in control, and mergers involving such ILCs.2 
The Proposed ILC Rule would not restrict the permis-
sible activities of Covered Companies and their non-
bank subsidiaries.
If adopted, the Proposed ILC Rule would open the 
door to widespread acquisitions of ILCs by nonfinancial 
firms engaged in industrial, retail, information technol-
ogy, and other types of commercial activities (hereinaf-
ter collectively referred to as “commercial firms”). The 
likelihood that many commercial firms would acquire 
ILCs is indicated by the FDIC’s approval, on March 18, 
2020, of deposit insurance applications filed by ILCs 
owned by Square and Nelnet. Square and Nelnet would 
not qualify for status as Fed-supervised bank holding 
companies under the Bank Holding Company Act 
(BHC Act) because they engage in both financial and 
nonfinancial activities.3
The FDIC’s issuance of the Proposed ILC Rule 
and the FDIC’s approvals of Square’s and Nelnet’s 
applications represent a fundamental change in policy. 
Those actions effectively reverse the FDIC’s previous 
policy of barring acquisitions of ILCs by commercial 
firms. The FDIC imposed an 18-month moratorium 
on acquisitions of ILCs by commercial firms between 
July 2006 and January 2008. The Dodd–Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–
Frank Act) placed a three-year moratorium on such 
acquisitions between July 2010 and July 2013. The 
FDIC did not allow any firms engaged in nonfinan-
cial (commercial) activities to acquire ILCs from the 
imposition of its moratorium in July 2006 until the 
agency approved Square’s and Nelnet’s applications in 
March 2020.4
Several applications seeking deposit insurance for 
commercially-owned ILCs are currently pending before 
the FDIC.5 Rakuten recently announced that it was 
temporarily withdrawing its application “to incorporate 
feedback from the FDIC.” At the same time, Rakuten 
stated that it “will continue to work constructively with 
the FDIC and the State of Utah to move forward with 
our applications.”6 Rakuten is a large Japanese company 
involved in e-commerce, information technology, and 
other commercial activities. Rakuten’s global website 
says that Rakuten “has grown to encompass over 70 
businesses across e-commerce, digital content, commu-
nications and fintech,” ranging from “new open plat-
forms for e-commerce, to experiments with drones, 
chatbots, deep learning and AI.” Rakuten’s website also 
declares that “we challenge the status quo” and “embrace 
new and disruptive ideas.”7
Rakuten has been called the “the Amazon.com of 
Japan.” If the FDIC approves Rakuten’s application, 
that approval would encourage many other information 
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technology firms and e-commerce firms to pursue 
opportunities to acquire ILCs.8
If adopted, the Proposed ILC Rule would be con-
trary to the public interest and unlawful for the follow-
ing reasons:
(1) Further acquisitions of ILCs by commercial firms 
would (a) undermine Congress’s longstanding 
policy of separating banking and commerce, (b) 
threaten to inflict large losses on the federal “safety 
net” for financial institutions during future systemic 
crises, and (c) pose grave dangers to the stability of 
our financial system and the health of our economy.
(2) Further acquisitions of ILCs by commercial firms 
would create toxic conflicts of interest and would 
also pose serious threats to competition and con-
sumer welfare.
(3) The FDIC’s limited supervisory powers over par-
ent companies and other affiliates of ILCs are 
plainly inadequate to prevent the systemic risks, 
conflicts of interest, and threats to competition and 
consumer welfare created by commercially-owned 
ILCs.
(4) Adoption of the Proposed ILC Rule would be 
contrary to the public interest factors specified in 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Act and would also 
violate the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
The following analysis explains why adopting the 
Proposed ILC Rule would be contrary to the public 
interest and unlawful. Moreover, the FDIC should not 
adopt the Proposed ILC Rule while our nation is preoc-
cupied with the challenges of responding to the global 
COVID-19 pandemic. The FDIC should withdraw the 
Proposed ILC Rule or postpone any further action on 
the Rule, until (1) the enormous problems caused by 
the pandemic have been successfully resolved, and (2) 
as required by the APA, the FDIC has completed the 
following actions: (a) explaining the factual, legal, and 
policy basis for the FDIC’s decision to change its policy 
on acquisitions of ILCs by commercial firms, and (b) 
providing public notice of that explanation and afford-
ing the public a reasonable opportunity to submit com-
ments on the FDIC’s change in policy and the agency’s 
stated reasons for making that change. The FDIC should 
not approve any additional acquisitions of ILCs by com-
mercial firms until all of the foregoing actions have been 
completed.
Analysis
1. Further acquisitions of ILCs by commercial 
firms would undermine the policy of 
separating banking and commerce, threaten 
to inflict large losses on the federal “safety 
net” for financial institutions, and pose grave 
dangers to the stability of our financial system 
and the health of our economy.
a. Adopting the Proposed ILC Rule would 
undermine Congress’s longstanding policy of 
separating banking and commerce.
The BHC Act generally prohibits commercial firms 
from acquiring or exercising control over FDIC-insured 
banks, in accordance with Congress’s longstanding pol-
icy of separating banking and commerce.9 Under 12 
U.S.C. 1841(c)(2)(H), which was enacted in 1987, ILCs 
are exempted from the definition of “bank” for pur-
poses of the BHC Act if they do not accept demand 
(checking) deposits from for-profit business firms. ILCs 
are FDIC-insured depository institutions, and they are 
currently chartered and regulated by five states. Of the 
25 existing ILCs (including Square and Nelnet), 16 are 
chartered by Utah and four are chartered by Nevada.10
When the ILC exemption was adopted in 1987, 
ILCs were small, locally-focused institutions that offered 
deposit and credit services to lower- and middle-income 
consumers. ILCs were first organized in the early 1900s 
as small loan companies that provided credit to indus-
trial workers. ILCs did not become generally eligible 
for federal deposit insurance until 1982. The total assets 
of ILCs in 1987 were only $4.2 billion, and the largest 
ILC had less than $420 million of assets. In 1992, U.S. 
banks and trust companies held total assets of $3.5 tril-
lion—500 times the size of the $7 billion of total assets 
held by ILCs. A 1993 report from the Congressional 
Research Service (CRS) confirmed that ILCs played 
only a “minor” role in the U.S. financial system.11
In July 2005, Walmart, the largest U.S. retailer, applied 
to acquire (and obtain deposit insurance for) a Utah 
ILC. Walmart’s application triggered widespread pub-
lic opposition and led to an extensive debate about 
the desirability of allowing large commercial firms to 
acquire ILCs. During one of the FDIC’s public hearings 
on Walmart’s application in April 2006, Senator Jake 
Garn (R-UT)—the sponsor of the 1987 exemption for 
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ILCs—stated that “it was never my intent, as the author 
of this particular section, that any of these industrial 
banks be involved in retail [commercial] operations.”12
In response to the vigorous public attacks on 
Walmart’s application, the FDIC imposed a six-month 
moratorium on acquisitions of ILCs by commercial 
firms in July 2006. In its moratorium notice, the FDIC 
observed that the “evolution” of the “ILC industry” was 
occurring “in ways that may not have been anticipated 
at the time [Senator Garn’s exemption] was enacted in 
1987.”13 In January 2007, the FDIC extended its mor-
atorium for an additional year. In the FDIC’s mora-
torium extension notice, the agency pointed out that 
“business plans” for ILCs owned by commercial firms 
“differ substantially from the consumer lending focus of 
the original industrial banks.”14
Walmart withdrew its ILC application in March 
2007, due to the FDIC’s extended moratorium and the 
intense public hostility toward Walmart’s application. 
The magnitude of the outcry against Walmart’s pro-
posed ILC—which included statements of opposition 
from many members of Congress—supported Senator 
Garn’s view that Walmart’s application went far beyond 
the intended scope of the exemption he sponsored in 
1987.15
Notwithstanding Walmart’s decisive defeat, the 
Proposed ILC Rule states that “the industrial bank 
exemption in the [BHC Act] . . . provides an avenue 
for commercial firms to own or control a bank.”16 
However, there is no evidence indicating that Congress 
either intended or expected in 1987 that Senator Garn’s 
exemption would lead to acquisitions of ILCs by com-
mercial firms.
Senator Garn’s exemption was enacted as part of the 
Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 (CEBA). 
CEBA reaffirmed and strengthened Congress’s policy of 
separating banking and commerce by closing the “non-
bank bank loophole.” During the 1980s, many commer-
cial firms used the nonbank bank loophole to acquire 
FDIC-insured banks that either did not accept demand 
(checking) deposits or did not make commercial loans. 
CEBA closed that loophole by expanding the definition 
of “bank” in the BHC Act to include all “banks” that 
accepted FDIC-insured deposits. Senator Garn’s exemp-
tion excluded ILCs from the definition of “bank” for 
purposes of the BHC Act. However, CEBA’s legislative 
history did not include any explanation of the purpose 
or anticipated scope of Senator Garn’s exemption.17
The Senate committee report on CEBA declared 
that “[n]onbank banks undermine the principle of sep-
arating banking and commerce, a policy that has long 
been the keystone of our banking system. . . . The sep-
aration of banking from commerce helps ensure that 
banks allocate credit impartially, and without conflicts 
of interest.” The Senate committee report also explained 
that CEBA would close the nonbank bank loophole to 
“minimize the concentration of financial and economic 
resources” and enhance “the safety and soundness of our 
financial system.”18 During the floor debates on CEBA, 
“members of Congress emphasized that the nonbank 
bank loophole must be closed in order to preserve the 
general policy of separating banking and commerce and 
to ensure parity of regulatory treatment for all compa-
nies that controlled FDIC-insured banks.”19
It is highly unlikely that Congress intended that 
CEBA would reaffirm and strengthen the policy of sep-
arating banking and commerce by closing the non-
bank bank loophole, but would undermine and weaken 
the same policy by adopting Senator Garn’s exemption 
for ILCs. The implausibility of such a self-contradicting 
purpose is heightened by the absence of any evidence 
indicating that Congress expected that Senator Garn’s 
exemption could be used to break down the barrier 
between banking and commerce. In 1999—12 years 
after CEBA—Congress again reinforced the policy of 
separating banking and commerce by passing a statute 
that prohibited further acquisitions of FDIC-insured 
savings associations (thrifts) by commercial firms. In 
view of Congress’s powerful expressions of support for 
the policy of separating banking and commerce in both 
CEBA and the 1999 statute, the unexplained text of 
Senator Garn’s exemption should not be applied in a 
way that undermines that policy.20
Accordingly, the FDIC’s policy toward ILCs should 
remain consistent with Congress’s strongly articulated 
purpose of separating banking and commerce. The 
appropriate policy for the FDIC would be to allow 
acquisitions of ILCs by companies engaged in finan-
cial activities but not by firms engaged in commercial 
activities. As shown in Part 4 below, the appropriate 
policy is also supported by the public interest factors 
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that the FDIC must consider under the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Act when the FDIC reviews applications 
for deposit insurance, changes in control, and mergers 
involving ILCs.
The FDIC followed the appropriate policy when it 
did not approve Walmart’s application, imposed a mora-
torium on acquisitions of ILCs by commercial firms in 
June 2006, and extended that moratorium for another 
year in January 2007. The FDIC cited many of the risks 
and policy concerns described in this article when it 
adopted and extended its moratorium.21
The FDIC also followed the appropriate policy when 
it issued its CapitalSource order in June 2008. The FDIC 
permitted CapitalSource’s parent companies to engage 
“only in financial activities,” and the FDIC required 
those companies to divest any “non-conforming invest-
ments” within one year.22 The CapitalSource order was 
the FDIC’s last approval of deposit insurance for an ILC 
until it granted the Square and Nelnet applications.
In 2016, the federal banking agencies submitted 
a joint report to Congress and the Financial Stability 
Oversight Council (FSOC). The 2016 joint report 
evaluated the risks of bank activities and affiliations, as 
required by Section 620 of the Dodd–Frank Act. The 
Fed recommended that Congress should prohibit own-
ership of ILCs by commercial firms, based on many of 
the same risks and policy concerns cited by the FDIC 
when it adopted and extended its moratorium. The 
FDIC did not endorse the Fed’s recommendation in 
the 2016 joint report, but the FDIC did not object to 
the Fed’s recommendation and did not challenge the 
Fed’s analysis of the risks and policy concerns created 
by commercially-owned ILCs.23 As discussed in Part 4 
below, the Proposed ILC Rule does not explain why 
the FDIC has decided to change its policy and now 
intends to permit acquisitions of ILCs by commercial 
firms, despite the risks and policy concerns the FDIC 
identified in 2006 and 2007.
b. Further acquisitions of ILCs by commercial 
firms would be likely to inflict large losses on 
the federal “safety net” for financial institutions 
during future systemic crises.
 In view of the serious potential dangers posed by 
commercially-owned ILCs, the FDIC should not allow 
further acquisitions of ILCs by commercial firms. ILCs 
have frequently failed in the past, due to problems such 
as reckless lending, inadequate capital, and insufficient 
liquidity. Thirteen ILCs failed between 1982 and 1984. 
Two ILCs that were heavily engaged in subprime lend-
ing (Pacific Thrift and Loan and Southern Pacific Bank) 
failed in 1999 and 2003. Those two failures inflicted 
significant losses on the Deposit Insurance Fund. The 
number of ILCs declined from 58 to 23 between the 
beginning of the financial crisis in 2007 and the end of 
2019, and the total assets of ILCs dropped from $177 
billion to $141 billion.24
The Proposed ILC Rule greatly understates the risks 
posed by ILCs and their parent companies during a 
systemic crisis. The Proposed ILC Rule says that “the 
FDIC’s supervisory approach with respect to industrial 
banks was effective” because “[o]nly two small industrial 
banks failed during the [financial] crisis” of 2007–09.25 
The Proposed ILC Rule does not refer to any problems 
that occurred at corporate owners of ILCs during that 
crisis.
In fact, as described below, several large corporate 
owners of ILCs failed or were rescued by the federal 
government during the financial crisis. In some cases, 
the problems that threatened the survival of those cor-
porate owners were directly related to their ILCs. Four 
very large corporate owners of ILCs—General Motors 
Acceptance Corp. (GMAC), Merrill Lynch, Goldman 
Sachs, and Morgan Stanley—received huge bailouts 
from the federal government to prevent their failures. 
A fifth major ILC owner—GE Capital—encoun-
tered very serious liquidity problems during the crisis 
and received extensive financial assistance from federal 
agencies. A sixth corporate ILC owner—CIT Group—
failed in 2009, thereby wiping out $2.3 billion of tax-
payer-funded assistance that CIT received from the 
federal government’s Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(TARP). A seventh corporate ILC owner—Fremont 
General—collapsed in 2008, after suffering large losses 
related to the subprime mortgage lending activities of 
its ILC (Fremont Investment and Loan).
Thus, as the Fed correctly pointed out in the 2016 
joint report to Congress and FSOC, “companies that 
failed or required assistance at the outset of the 2008 
financial crisis included a number of companies that 
owned and controlled ILCs.” In the same report, the 
FDIC acknowledged that some “parent companies or 
Volume 39 • Number 5 • May 2020 Banking & Financial Services Policy Report • 5 
affiliates [of ILCs] failed or experienced severe stress” 
during the financial crisis.26
In 2008, GMAC held over $200 billion of assets and 
owned a large Utah ILC with $33 billion of assets and 
$17 billion of deposits. GMAC was the primary source 
of financing for dealers and retail customers who pur-
chased and leased General Motors (GM) vehicles. In 
2007 and 2008, GMAC suffered crippling losses from 
its subprime mortgage lending business and additional 
losses from its auto lending business. To prevent GMAC’s 
failure, the Fed approved GMAC’s emergency conver-
sion into a bank holding company in December 2008. 
Federal agencies provided over $40 billion of finan-
cial assistance to GMAC in the form of TARP capi-
tal infusions, FDIC debt guarantees, and purchases of 
commercial paper and emergency loans by the Fed. The 
federal government bailed out GMAC so that it could 
provide financing for vehicle sales and leases made by 
GM and Chrysler after federal agencies rescued both 
automakers.27
Merrill Lynch held almost $900 billion of assets 
and was the third largest U.S. securities broker-dealer 
in 2008. Merrill Lynch owned a Utah ILC with $60 
billion of deposits as well as a federal savings associa-
tion with $20 billion of deposits. Merrill Lynch suffered 
huge losses from its involvement in high-risk activi-
ties, including subprime lending and securitization. To 
avoid collapse, Merrill Lynch agreed to be acquired 
by Bank of America—at the urging of federal regula-
tors—during “Lehman weekend” in September 2008. 
Federal agencies subsequently provided more than $300 
billion of financial assistance to Bank of America and 
Merrill Lynch in the form of TARP capital infusions, 
asset and debt guarantees, purchases of commercial 
paper, and emergency Fed loans. A significant por-
tion of that enormous rescue package covered Merrill 
Lynch’s losses. Merrill Lynch would have failed, and it is 
doubtful whether Bank of America could have survived, 
without the federal government’s bailout.28
Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, the two larg-
est U.S. securities brokers, each held $1 trillion or 
more of assets in 2008. Goldman Sachs and Morgan 
Stanley each owned a Utah ILC with over $25 billion 
of assets. Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley—like 
Merrill Lynch—were heavily involved in high-risk, 
subprime-related activities during the boom leading to 
the financial crisis. A week after Lehman Brothers failed, 
the Fed approved applications by Goldman Sachs and 
Morgan Stanley for emergency conversions into bank 
holding companies to ensure their survival. Federal 
agencies provided financial support totaling over $300 
billion to Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley through 
TARP capital infusions, FDIC debt guarantees, and 
purchases of commercial paper and emergency loans 
by the Fed. Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley almost 
certainly would have failed without the federal govern-
ment’s support.29
GE Capital Corporation was a subsidiary of General 
Electric (GE) and engaged in a wide range of financial 
activities. GE Capital held almost $700 billion of assets 
in 2008, including a Utah ILC. GE Capital experienced 
severe liquidity problems after Lehman Brothers failed, 
including great difficulty in selling short-term com-
mercial paper to fund its operations. The Fed responded 
by purchasing $16 billion of GE Capital’s commercial 
paper, and the FDIC guaranteed over $70 billion of 
GE Capital’s newly-issued debt securities. GE Capital 
would have faced very serious funding challenges 
without the federal government’s extensive financial 
assistance.30
CIT Group was a large nonbank financial firm that 
provided commercial lending and leasing services to 
small- and medium-sized businesses, as well as subprime 
mortgages and student loans to consumers. CIT held 
$80 billion of assets in 2008, including a Utah ILC. In 
December 2008, the Fed approved CIT’s application for 
an emergency conversion into a bank holding company 
after CIT recorded large losses and experienced severe 
funding problems. CIT also received a $2.3 billion cap-
ital infusion from TARP. However, CIT’s problems con-
tinued, and it filed for bankruptcy in November 2009. 
CIT’s failure wiped out the federal government’s entire 
TARP investment in the firm.31
Thus, the federal government provided massive bail-
outs to rescue GMAC, Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, 
Morgan Stanley, and GE Capital during the financial 
crisis. In addition, the federal government lost its entire 
taxpayer-funded investment in CIT. Those bailouts and 
losses illustrate the enormous systemic risks that are 
likely to arise when large nonbank corporations acquire 
ILCs and combine the operations of those ILCs with 
their other activities.
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Fremont General provides another example of the 
potential risks created by ILCs and their parent com-
panies. Fremont General owned Fremont Investment 
and Loan, a California ILC with $13 billion of assets 
in 2006. Fremont Investment and Loan was a top-ten 
subprime mortgage lender, and it had one of the worst 
records among subprime lenders in terms of reckless 
underwriting, delinquencies, and defaults. The FDIC 
ordered Fremont to stop offering subprime mortgages 
in March 2007. However, that directive came too late to 
save Fremont. Fremont General filed for bankruptcy in 
June 2008, and the FDIC approved an emergency sale 
of Fremont Investment and Loan’s branches, deposits, 
and other assets to CapitalSource, a newly-organized 
California ILC. That emergency sale prevented the 
failure of Fremont Investment and Loan. However, the 
toxic subprime mortgages and mortgage-backed secu-
rities issued by Fremont Investment and Loan resulted 
in foreclosures for many borrowers and heavy losses for 
many investors.32
Accordingly, there is no doubt that corporate own-
ers of ILCs inflicted very significant costs on the U.S. 
financial system and taxpayers during the financial cri-
sis of 2007–09. In addition, corporate owners eagerly 
exploited their ILCs’ ability to generate federally-sub-
sidized, low-cost funding by offering FDIC-insured 
deposits. For example, Merrill Lynch created “sweep” 
accounts that allowed its customers to transfer cash 
balances from their uninsured accounts at Merrill’s 
securities broker-dealer to their FDIC-insured deposit 
accounts at Merrill’s ILC. Merrill Lynch’s sweep accounts 
were attractive to customers, but those accounts greatly 
increased the risk of losses to the Deposit Insurance 
Fund. Similarly, GMAC’s ILC used its FDIC-insured 
deposits as a low-cost source of funding for loans that 
financed sales and leases of GM vehicles. Other com-
mercial owners of ILCs—including Volkswagen, Toyota, 
and Target—also used their ILCs as captive financing 
agencies to support sales of their products.33
Corporate owners and their ILCs have used com-
mon brand names and coordinated business strategies 
to achieve a close integration of their operations. As 
shown above, close connections between ILCs and 
their parent companies forced federal bank regula-
tors to deal with serious problems at large corporate 
owners during the financial crisis of 2007–09. Federal 
agencies rescued several of those corporate owners to 
reduce the danger of contagious spillovers of risks and 
losses between the financial system and the economy. 
As discussed in the next section, those rescues extended 
the federal “safety net” far beyond the banking system, 
thereby creating very large risks for the federal govern-
ment and taxpayers.
c. Further acquisitions of ILCs by commercial 
firms would pose grave threats to the stability 
of our financial system and the health of our 
economy.
Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley 
were large financial conglomerates that functioned as 
“shadow banks” before the financial crisis of 2007–09. 
They offered federally-insured deposits, consumer loans, 
and commercial loans through the ILCs and thrifts they 
controlled. In addition, they provided “deposit sub-
stitutes” in the form of money market mutual funds, 
short-term commercial paper, and securities repurchase 
agreements (repos), all of which were payable in practice 
at par on demand. They also offered a wide array of sub-
stitutes for bank loans. The activities of “shadow bank” 
financial conglomerates effectively mirrored the func-
tions of bank-centered financial holding companies, 
which were authorized by the Gramm–Leach–Bliley 
Act of 1999 (GLBA). GLBA marked the culmination of 
a 20-year campaign in which large banks, federal regula-
tors, and Congress undermined and ultimately repealed 
the New Deal-era risk buffers that separated banks from 
the capital markets.34
GLBA’s enactment produced a financial system that 
was dominated by large bank-centered and “shadow 
bank” financial conglomerates. The activities of those 
financial conglomerates created fragile, high-risk net-
works that connected systemically important financial 
institutions to all major segments of our financial mar-
kets. The hazardous networks produced by large finan-
cial conglomerates forced federal regulators to extend 
the federal “safety net” for banks so that it encompassed 
all major segments of our financial markets during the 
financial crisis of 2007–09. The federal “safety net”—
including the FDIC’s Deposit Insurance Fund, the Fed’s 
emergency lending programs, and the Fed-supervised 
payments system—was originally intended to be avail-
able only to federally-insured depository institutions. 
However, the Fed and the Treasury Department created 
a wide array of emergency programs between 2007 and 
2009, which provided comprehensive protection for the 
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liabilities of banks, securities broker-dealers, insurance 
companies, and other “shadow banks.”35
The Fed and other leading central banks also adopted 
“quantitative easing” (QE) policies to stabilize strug-
gling economies and provide liquidity to highly stressed 
financial markets. Under those QE policies, central 
banks made extensive purchases of government bonds, 
mortgage-backed securities, and (in some cases) corpo-
rate securities. QE policies caused the balance sheets of 
the Fed, the Bank of England, the European Central 
Bank, and the Bank of Japan to expand from $4 trillion 
to $15 trillion between 2007 and 2018.36
QE policies provided huge infusions of liquidity 
into the world’s financial markets. Repeated infusions 
of central bank liquidity caused market participants to 
view central banks as de facto guarantors of the stability 
of financial markets. Expectations of continued central 
bank support encouraged a massive expansion of credit 
for governments, businesses, and households. Total global 
debt levels increased from $167 trillion to $253 trillion 
between 2007 and 2019, and global debt as a percentage 
of global GDP rose from 275% to 322% during that 
period. The enormous growth of global debt after the 
financial crisis raised serious concerns about the sustain-
ability of debt levels in both developed and developing 
countries.37
The huge debt burdens assumed by governments, 
businesses, and consumers left them in a highly vulner-
able position when the COVID-19 pandemic suddenly 
struck countries around the world. Governments and 
central banks responded to the pandemic by recreat-
ing most of the emergency programs they used during 
the crisis of 2007–09. In addition, governments adopted 
major new stimulus programs, while central banks 
launched new types of liquidity assistance programs and 
aggressive new QE initiatives. The extraordinary speed 
and scope of the responses by governments and cen-
tral banks to the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated 
that global financial markets remain highly leveraged 
and dangerously fragile, despite all of the post-crisis 
reforms. One of the most troubling developments is that 
post-crisis reforms have not changed the basic structure 
of our financial system, including the unhealthy domi-
nance of giant financial conglomerates within that sys-
tem. Consequently, governments and central banks have 
again been forced to provide unlimited support for all 
major segments of the financial markets to ensure the 
survival of those conglomerates.38
As explained above, the creation of giant financial 
conglomerates broke down the risk buffers established 
during the New Deal and its aftermath. Those risk buf-
fers prevented contagious spillovers of losses between 
the banking system and the capital markets from World 
War II through the 1980s. GLBA eliminated those buf-
fers and allowed banks to establish full-scale affiliations 
with nonbank financial firms. By taking that fateful step, 
GLBA greatly increased the likelihood that serious dis-
ruptions occurring in one sector of our financial sys-
tem would spread to other sectors. The systemic dangers 
posed by large financial conglomerates forced regulators 
to expand the federal “safety net” for banks to protect all 
important segments of our financial markets during the 
financial crisis of 2007–09 and again during the current 
pandemic. Those vast expansions of the “safety net” have 
imposed great risks and costs on the federal govern-
ment and taxpayers, and they have severely undermined 
the effectiveness of market discipline in our financial 
system.39
The same spreading of risks and costs—and the same 
impairment of market discipline—would occur on an 
even larger scale if the FDIC allows further acquisitions 
of ILCs by nonfinancial (commercial) firms. The federal 
government’s rescues of GMAC, GE Capital, and CIT 
demonstrate the hazards created by affiliations between 
commercial firms and ILCs. As explained in Part 2 
below, allowing more acquisitions of ILCs by commer-
cial firms would produce intense pressures for repealing 
our policy of separating banking and commerce, thereby 
permitting combinations between all types of banks and 
all categories of commercial firms.
Widespread affiliations between banks and com-
mercial firms would greatly increase the likelihood of 
contagious spillovers of risks and losses between the 
financial system and the economy. As commercial-fi-
nancial conglomerates became systemically important 
entities, the federal government would have powerful 
incentives to spend massive sums to prevent serious dis-
ruptions from occurring in either the financial system 
or the economy.40 The federal government’s extraordi-
nary responses to the COVID-19 pandemic indicate 
that our nation is already moving toward that perilous 
and very costly state of affairs.
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Problems at large commercial-financial conglom-
erates have frequently served as catalysts for systemic 
financial and economic crises in the past. The first major 
U.S. banking crisis of the Great Depression was precip-
itated by the failures of two large commercial-finan-
cial conglomerates in late 1930. In November 1930, the 
downfall of Caldwell and Company—a large financial 
and industrial conglomerate headquartered in Nashville, 
Tennessee—caused a regional banking panic in several 
southern states. The following month, the collapse of 
Bank of United States—a large banking, securities, 
and real estate conglomerate in New York City—dis-
rupted financial markets in the Middle Atlantic region 
and caused a serious loss of public confidence in the 
U.S. banking system. In February 1933, the failures of 
Michigan’s two largest banks—which had extensive 
securities and real estate operations—forced Michigan 
to declare a statewide bank holiday, thereby triggering a 
nationwide banking panic.41
In May 1931, the collapse of Creditanstalt—Austria’s 
biggest universal bank, which held ownership stakes in 
many Austrian commercial enterprises—set off a devas-
tating financial and economic crisis that swept through 
Europe. The European crisis resulted in widespread fail-
ures and bailouts at large universal banks in Germany, 
Italy, and Belgium. The Great Depression’s impact was 
especially severe in the U.S. and in European countries 
with universal banking systems. In both the U.S. and 
Europe, vulnerable networks that linked major banks, 
securities markets, and commercial firms produced cata-
strophic spillovers of risks and losses that destroyed entire 
financial systems and economies. In contrast, Canada 
and Great Britain did not experience systemic financial 
crises during the Great Depression. One reason for their 
superior performance was that banks in both countries 
were separated from securities markets and did not hold 
equity stakes in commercial firms.42
During the 1990s, systemic financial and economic 
crises occurred in Japan, Mexico, and South Korea. In 
all three countries, leading banks were closely con-
nected to large commercial firms through cross-share-
holding networks and other joint control arrangements. 
Conglomerate-style networks were known as keiretsu 
in Japan and chaebol in South Korea, and they were 
centered around wealthy families in Mexico. In the 
1990s, all three nations experienced contagious cri-
ses that severely damaged their financial systems and 
devastated their economies. The catastrophic crises of 
the 1990s in Japan, Mexico, and South Korea provide 
strong warnings about the risks of allowing banks to 
affiliate with commercial firms. Such affiliations greatly 
increase the likelihood of contagious crises that could 
wreak havoc on both the financial system and the 
economy.43
2. Further acquisitions of ILCs by commercial 
firms would create toxic conflicts of interest 
and would also pose serious threats to 
competition and consumer welfare.
Acquisitions of ILCs by commercial firms produce 
dangerous and destructive conflicts of interest. In 1970 
and 1987, Congress amended the BHC Act to stop 
commercial enterprises from acquiring FDIC-insured 
banks. On both occasions, Congress determined that 
the creation of commercial-financial conglomerates 
would seriously impair the objectivity of bank lending 
and encourage preferential and reckless credit practices. 
Congress recognized that commercially-owned banks 
have strong incentives to (A) make unsound loans to 
their commercial affiliates, (B) deny credit to competi-
tors of their commercial affiliates, and (C) provide risky 
loans to help customers buy goods or services from their 
commercial affiliates. The Senate committee report on 
the 1987 legislation (CEBA) warned that allowing 
commercial firms to own banks “raises the risk that the 
banks’ credit decisions will be based not on economic 
merit but on the business strategies of their corporate 
parents.”44
Congress’s strong concerns about the biased lend-
ing practices of commercially-owned banks were 
well-founded. Commercially-owned ILCs have fre-
quently adopted lending policies that support the 
business activities of their parent company and other 
affiliates. The Proposed ILC Rule states that “[a] sig-
nificant number of the 23 existing industrial banks 
support the commercial or specialty finance oper-
ations of their parent company.”45 In 2006, FDIC 
General Counsel Douglas Jones explained that two 
commercially-owned ILCs—Volkswagen Bank and 
Toyota Financial Savings Bank—provided loans to 
finance purchases of vehicles manufactured by their 
parent companies. A third commercially-owned 
ILC—Target Bank—issued proprietary credit cards 
to businesses to finance their purchases of goods at 
Target stores.46 As discussed above, GMAC was the 
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primary source of credit for dealers and consumers 
who bought or leased GM vehicles.47 Square’s new-
ly-approved ILC will make loans to merchants who 
process their credit card transactions through Square’s 
proprietary payments system.48
Preferential, high-risk lending and other conflicts of 
interest have frequently occurred at commercial-finan-
cial conglomerates in the past. Caldwell and Company, 
Bank of United States, American Continental (the 
parent company of Charles Keating’s Lincoln Savings 
and Loan), and commercial-financial conglomerates in 
Japan, South Korea, and Mexico engaged in reckless 
lending, preferential transfers of funds, and other abusive 
transactions that benefited their commercial affiliates 
and inflicted devastating losses on the depository insti-
tutions they controlled.49
The subsidies and other benefits that FDIC-insured 
depository institutions receive from the federal “safety 
net” create powerful incentives for commercial firms 
to acquire ILCs. “Safety net” benefits include (1) low-
cost funding from FDIC-insured deposits, (2) access to 
the Fed’s emergency lending programs for depository 
institutions, and (3) access to Fed-supervised payments 
systems for checks, credit cards, debit cards, online and 
mobile payments, and wire transfers.50
Supporters of commercially-owned ILCs argue 
that the Federal Reserve Act’s restrictions on affiliate 
transactions and insider lending will prevent commer-
cial parent companies from abusing the federal “safety 
net.” However, those complex and technical provisions 
are very difficult to enforce in a timely and effective 
manner. Troubled financial institutions have frequently 
violated those restrictions in the past. For example, two 
large ILCs that failed in 1999 and 2003—Pacific Thrift 
and Southern Pacific Bank—violated affiliate transac-
tion rules before they failed. In 1994, the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) studied 175 bank failures 
that occurred during the 1980s. The GAO determined 
that 82 of the failed banks breached insider lending lim-
its, and 49 of the failed banks violated affiliate trans-
action rules. American Continental and its subsidiary, 
Lincoln Savings and Loan, collapsed after committing 
widespread and flagrant infractions of insider lending 
limits, affiliate transaction rules, and other prudential 
regulations. The Lincoln Savings debacle cost the federal 
government $2.7 billion.51
During serious financial disruptions, the Fed has 
repeatedly waived the quantitative limits on affiliate 
transactions under Section 23A of the Federal Reserve 
Act. The Fed’s waivers have allowed big banks to provide 
huge amounts of financial assistance to their troubled 
nonbank affiliates. The Fed approved large-scale waivers 
of Section 23A after the terrorist attacks on 9/11 and 
granted even more extensive waivers of Section 23A 
during the financial crisis of 2007–09. The Fed’s waivers 
permitted major banks to make enormous transfers of 
funds to support their affiliated securities broker-deal-
ers, sponsored mutual funds, and other nonbank affili-
ates. The Fed also approved waivers that allowed GMAC 
to finance most of GM’s and Chrysler’s sales of vehicles 
after the federal government rescued both automak-
ers.52 As Saule Omarova pointed out, the Fed’s extraor-
dinary waivers of Section 23A during the financial crisis 
authorized “massive transfers of funds” that “purposely 
exposed banks to risks associated with their affiliates’ 
nonbanking business and transferred [the] federal sub-
sidy outside the [banking] system.”53
Based on past experience, it is very unlikely that fed-
eral regulators would enforce affiliate transaction rules 
against large commercial owners of ILCs during future 
systemic crises. As shown by GMAC’s example, regula-
tors would probably allow commercially-owned ILCs 
to make large transfers of funds to support their com-
mercial affiliates during future financial and economic 
disruptions. As a practical matter, those transfers would 
extend the federal “safety net” for FDIC-insured depos-
itory institutions into many commercial sectors of our 
economy.
The access of commercially-owned ILCs to the 
federal “safety net” would give significant competitive 
advantages to their parent companies. In addition to the 
low-cost funding provided by their ILCs’ deposits, large 
commercial owners would receive implicit “catastro-
phe insurance” in the form of expected federal support 
during future systemic crises. In contrast, smaller com-
mercial firms that could not satisfy the capital require-
ments and other conditions set forth in the Proposed 
ILC Rule would not able to acquire ILCs and would 
be placed at a serious competitive disadvantage. Thus, 
allowing commercial firms to acquire ILCs would cre-
ate a highly skewed playing field favoring commercial 
firms that own ILCs and handicapping those that do 
not.54
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The financial sector and many commercial sectors 
of our economy (including the information technology 
industry) already display very high levels of concentra-
tion and are dominated by a small group of giant firms. 
High concentration levels enable big incumbent firms 
to leverage their market power and capture unjustified 
super-profits by (i) imposing unfair prices on custom-
ers and suppliers, (ii) acquiring smaller competitors or 
destroying them with predatory pricing policies, and (iii) 
deterring entry by new competitors.55 The Proposed 
ILC Rule would allow big commercial firms to gain an 
additional competitive edge by acquiring ILCs, thereby 
further impairing competition and harming customers 
and suppliers in many lines of commerce.
Allowing acquisitions of ILCs by “Big Tech” firms 
like Alphabet (Google), Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and 
Microsoft would fundamentally change our financial 
system and economy in ways that are likely to be very 
harmful to consumers and communities. “Big Tech” 
firms already enjoy significant potential advantages 
over banks in the fields of automation, artificial intel-
ligence, data management, and mobile payments. The 
rapid growth of Alibaba, Ant Financial, and Tencent in 
China’s financial system indicates that “Big Tech” firms 
could potentially dominate major segments of our 
financial industry if those firms are allowed to estab-
lish “in-house banks” and exploit their technological 
advantages. Financial regulators around the world are 
just beginning to grapple with a wide array of public 
policy issues related to the potential entry of “Big Tech” 
firms into the banking industry. Those issues include 
concerns about unfair competition, abusive sharing of 
customer data, violations of customer privacy rights, and 
operational and systemic risks resulting from ownership 
of banks by giant technology firms.56 The FDIC should 
not preempt the ongoing consideration of those vitally 
important issues by allowing “Big Tech” firms to acquire 
ILCs.
Acquisitions of ILCs by “Big Tech” firms would pro-
duce intense pressures for removing all of the BHC Act’s 
restrictions on joint ownership of banks and commercial 
firms. “Big Tech” firms would not be satisfied with mak-
ing “toehold” acquisitions of ILCs. They would want 
to build a bigger competitive presence in the financial 
industry by acquiring large banks. Conversely, big banks 
would argue that Congress must create a “level playing 
field” by allowing banks to acquire technology firms. As 
shown by the demise of the New Deal’s risk buffers that 
separated banks from the capital markets, the creation of 
“loopholes” in prudential buffers inevitably leads to the 
destruction of those protections.57
Thus, allowing “Big Tech” firms to acquire ILCs 
would almost certainly lead to large-scale combinations 
between giant technology firms and big banks. Those 
combinations would magnify the problems that already 
exist due to the excessive levels of concentration, the 
“too big to fail” subsidies, and the unhealthy political 
influence that our technology giants and megabanks 
currently command and exploit.
3. The FDIC’s limited supervisory powers over 
parent companies and other affiliates of ILCs 
are plainly inadequate to prevent the systemic 
risks, conflicts of interest, and threats to 
competition and consumer welfare created by 
commercially-owned ILCs.
The FDIC’s circumscribed supervisory author-
ity over parent companies and other affiliates of ILCs 
cannot remove the grave dangers posed by commer-
cially-owned ILCs. The Proposed ILC Rule cites only 
two statutes that specifically empower the FDIC to 
supervise Covered Companies that control ILCs. First, 
under 12 U.S.C. 1820(b)(4), the FDIC may examine 
“the affairs of any affiliate” of an ILC, including the 
parent company, to the extent “necessary to disclose 
fully . . . the relationship between the [ILC] and any 
such affiliate; and . . . the effect of such relationship 
on the [ILC].” Second, under 12 U.S.C. 1831o-1(b), 
the FDIC may require a Covered Company “to serve 
as a source of financial strength” for its ILC subsidi-
ary.58 Neither of those statutes would allow the FDIC 
to exercise consolidated supervision over Covered 
Companies.
The Proposed ILC Rule would require Covered 
Companies to enter into written agreements obligat-
ing Covered Companies and their nonbank subsidiar-
ies to satisfy eight commitments.59 The examination 
and reporting commitments set forth in proposed 12 
C.F.R. 354.4(a)(1), (a)(3)(iii) & (iv), and (a)(4) appear 
to fall within the FDIC’s limited supervisory author-
ity over “affiliates” of ILCs under 12 U.S.C. 1820(b)(4). 
The capital and liquidity maintenance commitment set 
forth in proposed 12 C.F.R. 354(a)(7) seems to be con-
sistent with the FDIC’s authority to require a Covered 
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Company “to serve as a source of financial strength” 
for its ILC subsidiary under 12 U.S.C. 1831o-1(b). The 
commitment contained in proposed 12 C.F.R. 354(a)(5), 
requiring annual audits for ILCs, appears to be a proper 
exercise of the FDIC’s general authority to supervise 
and ensure the safety and soundness of FDIC-insured 
depository institutions.
In contrast, it is doubtful whether the FDIC has 
authority to require Covered Companies and their 
nonbank subsidiaries to agree to the other commit-
ments contained in proposed Section 354.4. The 
FDIC does not cite any specific sources of statutory 
authority that would (A) allow the FDIC to examine 
Covered Companies and their nonbank subsidiaries 
to the extent described in proposed Section 354.4(a)
(2), or (B) require Covered Companies to provide 
annual reports covering all of the matters described in 
proposed Section 354.4(a)(3)(i) & (ii), or (C) require 
Covered Companies to accept the corporate gover-
nance restrictions and tax allocation obligation set 
forth in proposed Section 354.4(a)(6) & (8). Covered 
Companies could potentially file lawsuits to challenge 
the FDIC’s authority to impose those commitments on 
an involuntary basis.60
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the 
FDIC could require Covered Companies to satisfy all of 
the commitments listed in proposed Section 354.4, the 
resulting regime would still fall well short of the com-
prehensive, consolidated supervision that the Fed exer-
cises over bank holding companies. Under proposed 
Section 354.4, the FDIC could not conduct unlimited, 
full-scope examinations of Covered Companies and 
their nonbank subsidiaries. The FDIC also could not 
impose consolidated capital requirements or consoli-
dated liquidity requirements on Covered Companies. 
Additionally, the FDIC could not require large Covered 
Companies to conduct stress tests or to prepare resolu-
tion plans pursuant to 12 U.S.C. 5365.61
In the 2016 joint report to Congress and FSOC, the 
Fed emphasized the risks created by the absence of a 
consolidated supervisory regime for parent companies 
and affiliates of ILCs:
[T]he ILC exemption creates special supervi-
sory risks because an ILC’s parent company and 
nonbank affiliates are not subject to consolidated 
supervision. Lack of consolidated supervision is 
problematic because the organization may operate 
and manage its businesses on an integrated basis, 
and, in the Federal Reserve’s experience, risks 
that cross legal entities and that are managed on a 
consolidated basis cannot be monitored properly 
through supervision directed at any one, or even 
several, of the legal entity subdivisions within the 
overall organization. Moreover, history demon-
strates that financial distress in one part of a busi-
ness organization can spread, sometimes rapidly, to 
other parts of the organization.62
In the same 2016 report, the FDIC acknowledged 
that parent companies of ILCs “are not subject to con-
solidated supervision.” The FDIC also did not disagree 
with the Fed’s analysis of the risks created by that lack 
of consolidated supervision, although the FDIC said 
that it used “prudential conditions” to “mitigate” those 
risks.63 In fact, as shown above in Part 1(b), several large 
corporate owners of ILCs either failed or required fed-
eral bailouts to survive during the financial crisis. Those 
failures and bailouts revealed the risks and costs that 
resulted from the FDIC’s inability to supervise those 
corporate owners effectively.
In January 2007, when the FDIC extended its 
moratorium on acquisitions of ILCs by commercial 
firms, the FDIC expressed its “continuing concerns 
regarding the commercial ownership of industrial 
banks and the lack of a Federal Consolidated Bank 
Supervisor” for commercial parent companies of 
ILCs. At the same time, the FDIC proposed a set of 
supervisory commitments for parent companies that 
owned ILCs and “engaged only in financial activi-
ties.” The FDIC’s proposed supervisory commitments 
for “financial” parent companies were similar to the 
commitments set forth in proposed Section 354.4. 
However, the FDIC made clear in 2007 that it was not 
willing to rely on those supervisory commitments as 
a satisfactory basis for regulating commercial owners 
of ILCs. Instead, the FDIC extended its moratorium 
to ensure that commercial firms would not acquire 
ILCs.64
Even if Congress designated the FDIC (or some 
other federal agency) as the consolidated supervisor of 
commercially-owned ILCs, that step would not remove 
the grave dangers posed by commercial-financial 
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conglomerates. A consolidated federal supervisor for 
commercially-owned ILCs would be hobbled by 
at least four unsolvable problems. First, neither the 
FDIC nor any other federal agency has the experi-
ence and resources needed to regulate large commer-
cial firms. Any consolidated federal supervisor would 
face enormous logistical challenges, including the 
great difficulty and expense of hiring personnel with 
expertise in many different commercial sectors of the 
U.S. economy. The well-documented failures of fed-
eral financial agencies to regulate bank-centered and 
“shadow bank” financial conglomerates effectively 
prior to the financial crisis of 2007–09 should con-
vince us that any federal supervisor would be even 
less likely to succeed in regulating large commercial–
financial conglomerates.65
Second, designating a consolidated federal supervisor 
for commercial owners of ILCs would imply that the 
supervisor was a reliable monitor of the soundness and 
solvency of those commercial firms. That implication 
would provide a highly undesirable “seal of approval” for 
commercial owners of ILCs. Consolidated supervision 
would also strengthen the expectation among market 
participants that the federal government would inter-
vene to protect commercial owners of ILCs from failure 
during serious financial and economic disruptions.
Third, designating a consolidated federal supervisor 
for commercial owners of ILCs would greatly expand 
the scope and intensity of federal regulation over mul-
tiple commercial sectors of our economy. The resulting 
expansion of federal oversight would severely under-
mine the effectiveness of market pricing and market dis-
cipline within those affected sectors.
Fourth, large commercial owners of ILCs would 
almost certainly be considered “too big to fail” by reg-
ulators and market participants. Their presumed “too 
big to fail” status, along with their extensive lobby-
ing resources and political influence, would also make 
them “too big to discipline adequately.” For all four 
reasons, any attempt to create a system of consolidated 
supervision for commercial–financial conglomerates 
would be unworkable and undesirable. The imprac-
ticability and adverse effects of consolidated supervi-
sion for commercial–financial conglomerates present 
additional persuasive reasons for prohibiting their 
existence.66
4. Adoption of the Proposed ILC Rule would 
be contrary to the public interest factors 
specified in the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Act and would also violate the Administrative 
Procedure Act.
Under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDI Act), 
the FDIC must consider several public interest fac-
tors when it reviews applications for deposit insurance, 
changes in control, and mergers involving ILCs. Those 
public interest factors give the FDIC broad discretion 
to deny transactions that (1) present serious risks to 
the Deposit Insurance Fund or the stability of the U.S. 
banking system or financial system, (2) are likely to have 
significant anticompetitive effects, or (3) are inconsistent 
with the “convenience and needs of the community to 
be served.” As the Supreme Court has explained, the 
“ultimate test imposed” by such factors is the agency’s 
assessment of the overall “public interest.”67
Under 12 U.S.C. 1815 and 1816, the FDIC may deny 
applications by ILCs for deposit insurance after consid-
ering the “risk presented . . . to the Deposit Insurance 
Fund” as well as the “convenience and needs of the 
community to be served.” Under 12 U.S.C. 1817(j)(7), 
the FDIC may reject proposed changes in control of 
ILCs after considering the “anticompetitive effects” of 
such transactions, their impact on the “convenience and 
needs of the community to be served,” and any “adverse 
effect on the Deposit Insurance Fund.” Under 12 U.S.C. 
1828(c)(5), the FDIC may disapprove proposed mergers 
involving ILCs after considering the “anticompetitive 
effects” of such mergers, their impact on the “conve-
nience and needs of the community to be served,” and 
any “risk to the stability of the United States banking or 
financial system.”
If adopted, the Proposed ILC Rule would allow 
widespread acquisitions of ILCs by commercial firms. 
As shown above, those acquisitions would threaten (1) 
to inflict large losses on the Deposit Insurance Fund and 
other components of the federal “safety net” for banks 
during future crises, (2) to undermine the stability of the 
U.S. banking and financial systems, (3) to injure com-
petition by creating an unlevel playing field between 
commercial firms that own ILCs and those that do not, 
and (4) to harm the welfare of consumers and com-
munities by promoting conflicts of interest, impairing 
competition, endangering customer privacy, aggravating 
the risks of systemic economic and financial crises, and 
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increasing the likelihood of taxpayer-financed bailouts 
of commercial–financial conglomerates.
For all of the above reasons, adoption of the Proposed 
ILC Rule would be contrary to the public interest fac-
tors that the FDIC is required to consider under the 
FDI Act. When the FDIC imposed a moratorium on 
acquisitions of ILCs by commercial firms in July 2006 
and extended that moratorium in January 2007, the 
FDIC expressed significant concerns about the poten-
tial dangers of such acquisitions, including risks to the 
Deposit Insurance Fund and the U.S. financial system, 
harmful conflicts of interest, adverse effects on compe-
tition, and the absence of consolidated supervision for 
commercial owners of ILCs.68 The FDIC stated that it 
had authority to impose the moratorium based on “the 
broad statutory objectives of the FDI Act which include 
maintenance of public confidence in the banking sys-
tem by insuring deposits and maintaining the safety 
and soundness of insured depository institutions.” The 
FDIC also concluded that it should not approve acqui-
sitions of ILCs by commercial firms until it completed 
an evaluation that “carefully and comprehensively” 
studied the relevant risks and public policy concerns. 
Without such an evaluation, the FDIC determined that 
approving such acquisitions “may frustrate the substan-
tive policies the agency is charged with promoting.” In 
the 2016 joint report to Congress and FSOC, the Fed 
cited many of the same risks, policy concerns, and pub-
lic interest factors to support its recommendation that 
Congress should prohibit ownership of ILCs by com-
mercial firms.69
The Proposed ILC Rule does not include any dis-
cussion of the FDIC’s current evaluation of the risks 
and public policy concerns that the FDIC identified 
in 2006 and 2007 and the Fed reiterated in 2016. The 
Proposed ILC Rule only briefly refers to those risks 
and public policy concerns, and it does not provide the 
FDIC’s current assessment of either the significance or 
the validity of those risks and concerns. The Proposed 
ILC Rule does not argue that the FDIC’s moratorium 
was misguided, or that the risks and concerns motivat-
ing that moratorium are no longer relevant.70
Similarly, the Proposed ILC Rule does not provide 
the FDIC’s current evaluation of the public interest fac-
tors that the FDIC must consider in connection with 
transactions involving ILCs under 12 U.S.C. 1816, 
1817(j)(7), and 1828(c)(5). The Proposed ILC Rule cites 
those public interest factors only briefly, and it does not 
explain whether the FDIC currently agrees or disagrees 
with the agency’s previous consideration of those factors 
when it imposed its moratorium in 2006 and extended 
that moratorium in 2007.71
In sum, the Proposed ILC Rule (1) does not provide 
the factual, legal, and policy basis for the FDIC’s cur-
rent decision to consider and approve acquisitions of 
ILCs by commercial firms, and (2) does not describe 
the FDIC’s current evaluation of the risks, public pol-
icy concerns, and statutory public interest factors that 
the agency cited when it imposed an 18-month mor-
atorium on acquisitions of ILCs by commercial firms 
between July 2006 and January 2008 (and that the 
agency presumably considered when it did not approve 
any such acquisitions between January 2008 and March 
2020). In addition, the Proposed ILC Rule does not 
specifically invite the public to comment on the risks, 
concerns, and factors that the FDIC cited in July 2006 
and January 2007, or to comment on the FDIC’s cur-
rent decision to change its policy and permit acquisi-
tions of ILCs by commercial firms. None of the twenty 
“Questions” included in the Proposed ILC Rule refers 
to the risks and concerns identified by the FDIC in 
2006 and 2007, or to the reasons why the FDIC now 
intends to change its policy.72
In view of the glaring omissions described 
above, the Proposed ILC Rule is unlawful and 
invalid under the public notice requirement of the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 553(b)
(3). The Proposed ILC Rule violates Section 553(b)
(3) because it does not provide adequate public notice 
of (1) the FDIC’s current evaluation of the risks and 
public policy concerns that the FDIC identified in 
2006 and 2007 with regard to acquisitions of ILCs 
by commercial firms; (2) the FDIC’s current evalua-
tion of the public interest factors that the FDIC must 
consider under the FDI Act; and (3) the factual, legal, 
and policy basis for the FDIC’s decision to change its 
policy on acquisitions of ILCs by commercial firms. 
Accordingly, the Proposed ILC Rule violates Section 
553(b)(3) because it does not provide the public with 
adequate notice of, and a reasonable opportunity to 
submit informed comments on, the FDIC’s assessment 
of crucially important issues as well as the FDIC’s rea-
sons for changing its policy.73
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If adopted, the Proposed ILC Rule would also be 
“arbitrary and capricious,” and therefore unlawful, 
under a separate provision of the APA, 5 U.S.C. 706(2)
(A). As explained above, the Proposed ILC Rule rep-
resents a fundamental change in policy from the position 
taken by the FDIC when it imposed a moratorium on 
acquisitions of ILCs by commercial firms in July 2006, 
extended that moratorium in January 2007, and did not 
approve any acquisitions of ILCs by commercial firms 
between January 2008 and March 2020 (as indicated 
by its CapitalSource order in June 2008). As also shown 
above, the Proposed ILC Rule does not provide an ade-
quate explanation of the factual, legal, and policy basis 
for the FDIC’s decision to change its policy on such 
acquisitions. Indeed, the Proposed ILC Rule lacks any 
discussion of the reasons why the FDIC now disagrees 
with the agency’s previous assessment of the relevant 
risks, public policy concerns, and statutory public inter-
est factors. The Proposed ILC Rule is therefore “arbi-
trary and capricious” and invalid under the APA because 
it does not provide “good reasons” for the FDIC’s deci-
sion to change its policy, including “a ‘reasoned expla-
nation for disregarding’ the ‘facts and circumstances’ that 
underlay its previous decision.”74
Consequently, adoption of the Proposed ILC Rule 
would violate the APA unless the FDIC first completes 
the following steps: (1) the FDIC must evaluate the 
risks, public policy concerns, and statutory public inter-
est factors that the agency considered and cited when it 
imposed its moratorium in July 2006 and extended that 
moratorium in January 2007; (2) the FDIC must pro-
vide “good reasons” for changing its policy with respect 
to acquisitions of ILCs by commercial firms, including 
a “reasoned explanation” why the FDIC now disagrees 
with the agency’s previous assessments of those risks, 
public policy concerns, and public interest factors; and 
(3) the FDIC must provide public notice of the factual, 
legal, and policy basis for its change in policy, and the 
FDIC must give the public a reasonable opportunity to 
submit comments on the FDIC’s change in policy and 
its stated reasons for making that change.
There is an additional compelling reason why the 
FDIC should withdraw the Proposed ILC Rule or 
indefinitely postpone further action on that Rule. Our 
nation is currently preoccupied with the challenges of 
responding to the global COVID-19 pandemic. The 
pandemic has severely disrupted our financial system, 
economy, and society, thereby creating the equivalent of 
a wartime emergency. It would be highly inappropriate 
for the FDIC to adopt the Proposed ILC Rule during 
the pandemic, especially in view of the Rule’s far-reach-
ing and potentially very harmful effects on our financial 
system, economy, and society.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the FDIC should 
withdraw the Proposed ILC Rule or postpone any fur-
ther action on the Rule, until (1) the enormous prob-
lems caused by the COVID-19 pandemic have been 
successfully resolved, and (2) the FDIC has taken all 
of the steps required by the Administrative Procedure 
Act, as described in Part 4 above. The FDIC should not 
approve any additional acquisitions of commercial firms 
by ILCs until all of the foregoing actions have been 
completed.
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